Sweden's New Government

How politics matter

Since October 18, Sweden's new government consists of the conservative Moderates and Christian Democrats together with the center-right Liberals. The three are in minority and have struck a formal agreement with the far-right Sweden Democrats. The agreement gives the government support of a 176 to 173 majority in the Swedish Riksdag. The new government, as well as the preceding electoral campaign and the formation negotiations, represent several novelties and changes in Swedish political life. It also means major policy changes for the labor market, migration, and energy sector, with consequences for Sweden, Europe, and beyond, changes that suggest that it matters greatly if the left or the right is in office.

The Electoral Campaign

The electoral campaign cemented a historical reconstellation of the parliamentary parties (eight in number, since 2010). Ulf Kristersson, the Moderate leader, lauded the far-right, anti-immigrant and nationalist Sweden Democrats for their consistent stance in questions concerning migration and law and order. He stated that the only thing that would keep them from getting government portfolios if his proposed coalition won was the party’s inexperience. In this way, the Sweden Democrats completed their journey from a party sympathizing with Nazism in the 1990s to a formally coalitionable party in the 2020s.

The Sweden Democrats hit a new all-time high, becoming the second-largest party with 20.5 per cent of the vote and 73 seats. This is perhaps not so surprising, given the recognition that the Moderates, Christian Democrats and Liberals gave the party, and given the media’s focus on migration and criminality, issues that the Sweden Democrats have managed to make their own and where many perceive that they have credible solutions. The center-right thus campaigned on tougher treatment of potential gang members and refugees, coupled with a revival of nuclear power as the solution for the problems of rising energy prices and global heating.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the former government party, the Social Democrats, campaigned on... nothing, really. They put forward their leader, Magdalena Andersson, as a guarantor of wisely negotiated policies in general, stressed their active role in tightening Sweden's migration laws, and deliberately made no specific reform proposals. The Greens, Left, and Center parties were pushed to the side and received little attention, with the exception of a far-right sympathiser's failed attack on, or attempted murder of, Center leader Annie Lööf in July, allegedly for her implacable stance against the Sweden Democrats.

Thus, on the one side in the electoral campaign was a determined center-right, who managed to appear cohesive despite the apparent impossibility of uniting the Liberals and the far-right Sweden Democrats. The latter’s spokespersons have expressed support, for instance, for Hungary’s undermining of the free media and Poland’s restraint of the independent judiciary. On the other side was a relatively visionless and incohesive center-left, including a Left party whose current policies resemble the welfare-state reformism of the Social Democrats in the 1980s and a Center Party whose economic policy might be the most pro-business and market-friendly of all Swedish parties and that insists on labelling the Left as extreme. Despite this inequality in determination and apparent cohesiveness, the win was close. Furthermore, it should be seen in the light of decreased turnout and the formation of an ethnic migrant's party (Nyans) that got some support in traditionally leftist electoral districts, thus ironically benefiting the right-wing government and its far-right support. Beyond this, the campaign might best be remembered for the Christian Democratic leader brandishing a traditional Swedish sausage in a debate and the Liberal leader lauding the hot dog.

The Government Formation

The government-formation negotiations took about a month, which is relatively long by Swedish traditions, but potentially normal in the new landscape of eight parties, some of which are quite far from each other. The first procedure of the new parliament was to elect its speakers (by secret ballot). It was noteworthy that a few votes were cast for parliamentarians who had not been put forward as candidates and that the second deputy speaker, a Sweden Democrat, had to be voted on twice before being accepted. Commentators suggested that her creationist beliefs might have been a reason why not all government-party parliamentarians supported her at first.

After about a month, an agreement, the Tidö agreement (Tidöavtalet), was signed between the three government parties and the Sweden Democrats. The most prestigious portfolios went to the Moderates. The Liberal Party leader emphasized that behind the scenes, he and his party had secured support for publicly funded media and an investigation into the profits made by private firms who run publicly funded schools. The Sweden Democrats, in turn, received a number of committee chairmanships as compensation for being excluded from government and a coordination office was created to guarantee their insight into and influence over the agreed government policy and budget negotiations.

Many Liberal Party politicians expressed qualms about the Tidö agreement, but demands for a reconsideration were denied by the leader. A former leader quit the party and the Liberals were forced to defend against their exclusion from the European Parliament party group Renew Europe, in which politicians from other European states criticized the party for making itself dependent on the far-right Sweden Democrats. Indeed, if the choice of the Liberals to lend credit to a conservative-nationalist government appears puzzling, it is because it is. Arguably, unless it is a question of pure power politics, the best explanation for the Liberals' choice would be that its leaders are more alarmed by the potential socialism of the welfare-state policies of the Social Democrats and Left Party than with the anti-democratic and, for lack of better word, illiberal intentions of the Sweden Democrats. 

The policy and intentions of the New Government

The Sweden Democrats are thus in a position where they can act as both government and opposition. They can claim credit for policy that they believe in or that appears popular and they can criticize policy that does not have the results they want or does not go as far as they wish.

So what is the policy of the new government? Immediately after accession, the new Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson adopted a much more conciliatory and cautious tone, invoking the insecure international situation and the complexity of the problems that Sweden faces. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the government has only just started, a few things from the Tidö agreement itself have already received some attention. 

Concerning the labor market, the government wants to take the management of unemployment insurance away from the unions, which will decrease union strength further, and reduce unemployment insurance after 100 days of unemployment (the Sweden Democrats have made a big case for defending the current nominal levels in the initial period). Another policy directed against the unions is to introduce a "proportionality requirement" for strikes.

The government also wants to fight migrant exploitation in the labor market, but has declared that it wants to return the right to decide on labor migration to the employers, and not retain the system that was also in effect before 2008, in which unions, employers, and authorities together determined if there was need for labor migration in specific sectors. Instead, the only requirement for labor migrants is that jobs pay the Swedish median wage, which is a way to say that only high-skilled workers are officially welcome.

The government wants to make Sweden unattractive to potential migrants, conforming to EU minimum standards. Measures include restricting the right to family reunion, making it harder to get and easier to lose citizenship, and investigating the possibility to have the asylum-application process take place in transit centers, the possibility to expel people for bad behavior, and ways to make migrants return to their country of origin. Furthermore, rights to allocations and economic support for non-citizens will be restricted, and require qualification through work, tax payment, and legal residency.

In terms of law and order, the government wants to allow anonymous witnesses, criminilize gang affiliation, double the penalty levels for people who are gang members, and declare special geographical zones where the police can search people without a warrant. More money will be spent on law enforcement and the police, but with no requirement of reorganization to guarantee the presence of the police in local communities.

Concerning the environment and the climate, one noteable change is that the environmental ministry has been dismantled. Although the alleged idea is that the environment should imbue all policy, one is reminded of how the acceding center-right government in 1991 abolished the housing ministry with the intention to abolish housing as a political issue. In particular, the new government presents nuclear power as the solution both to energy costs and to the current climate crisis, despite its uncompetitive price and distant time scope. Gasoline consumption will be subsidized in the context of the current high fuel prices, support for wind energy will be withdrawn, and the reduced VAT on reparations will be withdrawn in order to promote the consumption of new merchandise. This all suggests that it is expensive pollution that will imbue the government's policy.

It should be noted that the government gives some attention to welfare state services and economic policy, too. The reforms within health care might have something to be commended. Yet, concerning owernship and economic distribution the center-right government is center-right, no matter the Sweden Democrats' insistence that they see to the interests of the common worker. Private organizations will be encouraged within welfare services, and possible restrictions on their publicly funded profits seem not to worry the companies that make up the "welfare-industrial" complex in Sweden. The Tidö agreement stipulates classical tax cuts, with (intended) consequences for both public funding and redistribution. As an example, in the coming budget, tax cuts on savings will be proposed. According to the Parliamentary Audit Service, this will benefit the richest. For instance, 24 per cent of the forecast cuts, 840 million SEK, will go to the richest 10 per cent. 

Final Note

The program of the new Swedish government is a mix of traditional center-right economic policy, nationalist identity politics, and measures that are openly hostile to a climate transition. Besides making life much harder for many (and better for a few), it will make Sweden poorer, given the loss of long-term economic injections that come with migrants, less redistribution towards the relatively poor (who increase their consumption more when their income increases than do the relatively rich) and forgone climate investment. 

Still, one thing should be clear. There are important political and ideological differences and lines of conflict. This is perhaps counter-intuitive, given that the Sweden Democrats have claimed much of the space left empty by the other parties that had been seen to draw closer to one another. Yet, it remains a fact that politics still matter, and that the differences between left and right are big, even when the win is as tight as 176-173 in terms of parliamentary seats.